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I. Introduction
When it comes to war, foreign policy bleeds through the legal structure. As Harold
Hungju Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, recently commented, sometimes
a policy proposal is "lawful but awful."' A state action may constitute a legal act, but its
negative repercussions may outweigh any potential benefit derived from following that
course of action. Prominently, the current controversy over the legality of the U.S. drone
attacks employed by military in Afghanistan brings this gritty truth to light. A close exami-
nation of international humanitarian law (IHL) reveals that the targeted use of drone at-
tacks is a legal means of warfare in the territory of an armed conflict, when used against
legal targets. Level targets include terrorists (both those involved long-term under the con-
tinuous combat function paradigm (CCF), as well as those briefly engaged in conflict under
the paradigm of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). Yet employing drones as a policy
of war may not always be good policy. This odd tension lies primarily in the lack of trans-
parency, safeguards, and accountability in the U.S. targeting process, as highlighted by re-
cent scholarship.2
In the following paragraphs, the legal and military history of the current conflict in Afg-
hanistan is examined at length, followed by an analysis of the current policy regarding use
of targeted drone attacks under the Obama administration. The discussion concludes with
an overview of specific steps the U.S. can take to clear the legal gap in its current policy.
This paper intends to bring together analysis on this issue in a new way which will stimu-
late a more informed discussion on the U.S. policy of targeted killings in Afghanistan, and to
serve as a point of departure on the policy of targeted killing more generally.
A. Factual History of the Conflict
While the U.S. has been fighting al-Qa'ida and its networks for over fifteen years,3 the
conflict did not reach the level of full-scale armed conflict until after the attacks on U.S. soil
on September 11, 2001.4 On September 18, 2001, in a joint resolution, the 107th Congress
passed the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force (hereinafter AUMF). The AUMF
gave the executive the power "to use all necessary and appropriate force" against those re-
sponsible for the terrorists attacks realized in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania on
September 11, 2001.s Congress passed this resolution consistent with the War Powers
Resolution.6
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the Annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25,
2010).
2. See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions, Addendum to the
Study on Targeted Killings, i 22, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston].
3. Al-Qa'ida's attacks include those on the U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole. See PHILIP
BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 13 (2008).
4. Id.
5. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
6. Id.
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At the time, al-Qa'ida based its operations in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. After at-
tempts to work with the Taliban in order to curtail al-Qa'ida's operations failed, the United
States allied with the Northern Alliance, an insurgency in northern Afghanistan, and in-
vaded Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.7 By November 12, Kabul had fal-
len.8 The Taliban were displaced from power, and had retreated to the outlying country-
side.9
The United States quickly sought to transition power back into Afghan hands, and the
Bonn Conference of December 2001, convened in response to the situation in Afghanistan,
established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to oversee this transition of
power.'0 At that time, leadership in Afghanistan was shared between the Afghanistan
Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, and ISAF."
Individual States shared leadership of ISAF on six-month rotations until 11 August 2003,
when NATO forces assumed command of ISAF.12
B. The Parties to the Conflict
1. ISAF
ISAF is a NATO-led military coalition committed to eradicating the remaining insurgen-
cy in Afghanistan in order to restore peace.' 3 Currently, it is headed by U.S. General David
H. Petraeus. Leadership in ISAF includes nine U.S. American officials, three British officials,
one French official, one Turkish official, three German officials, one Canadian official, one
Italian official, and one Belgian official.14 Afghanistan is divided into six regions, each over-
seen by a different ISAF allied nation: Turkey, the U.S. (with two unconnected regions),
Great Britain, Italy, and Germany.'s Currently, the U.S. alone contributes 90,000 troops to
the conflict.16 ISAF relies primarily on counter-insurgency operations (known as COIN) to
slowly wear down the remaining Taliban forces, who have become an insurgency.' 7
7. Jim Garamone, American Launches Strike against Al Qaeda, Taliban, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Oct. 7,
2001), http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?D=44680.
8. See Jim Garamone, Northern Alliance, U.S. Special Forces at Gates of Kabul, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Nov.
13, 2001), http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?D=44461.
9. Id.
10. History of the International Security Assistance Force, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Mission of the International Security Assistance Force, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
14. Leadership of the International Security Assistance Force, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/leadership.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
15. Troop Numbers and Contributions of the International Security Assistance Force, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE
FORCE, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php (last visited Apr. 7,
2011).
16. United States Troop Numbers and Contributions of the International Security Assistance Force, INT'L SEC.
ASSISTANCE FORCE, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/united-
states/index.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
17. LuCelia Ball, ISAF Operational Update: October 18, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-operational-update-oct.-18.html (last visited Apr.
7,2011).
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2. The Taliban
The Taliban is a Sunni Islamist group currently centered in Pashtun and Pakistan. 18 It
controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until the U.S. invasion in 2001.19 Its senior leader is Mul-
lah Muhammed Omar. 20 The recently created Council of United Mujahedeen, 21 initiated by
the Mullah, brings together the top Taliban leadership in an avowed fight against the Amer-
ican presence in Afghanistan. 22 Currently, it provides part of the base of insurgency in Afg-
hanistan, although in October 2010 its leadership began to warm to the idea of negotia-
tions with the current Afghani government and its supporting allies. 23
3. Al-Qa'ida
Al-Qa'ida is a multinational organization with the capability of "chameleon-like maneu-
vering."24 This ability is the result of "a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic
direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and as-
sociate organizations."25 Osama bin Laden operated as Emir General.26 Because of its inter-
national nature, pinpointing Al-Qa'ida's location is an absurd task. However, its leadership
appears to be concentrated in Waziristan in northern Pakistan. 7 This widely accepted ru-
mor is further affirmed by the intensity of recent CIA drone strikes in this area.28
C. The Weapon and the Method: Unmanned Drones Engaged in Targeted Killing
Drones are used for surveillance and for the elimination of targets.29 When used for mili-
tary force, drones engage in targeted killing. As defined by Philip Alston in his Addendum
to the Report on Extrajudicial killing, "[a] targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated
and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by
18. Archive of stories regarding the Taliban, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/taliban/index.html?inline=ny
t-org (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Taliban Archive].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Also known as the Quetta Shura. See joby Warrick & Peter Finn, CIA Director Says Secret Attacks in
Pakistan Have Hobbled Al-Qaeda, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2010, at Al.
22. Id.
23. Dexter Filkins, In Afghanistan, The Exit Plan Starts With 'If,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/weekinreview/17filkins.html?-r=1&scp=2&sq=afghanistan&
st=cse.
24. ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA 94 (2002).
25. Id. at 54.
26. Id. at 16.
27. Archive of stories regarding Al-Qa'ida, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/alqaeda/index.html?scp=1-
spot&sq=al%20qaeda&st=cse (last visited Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Al-Qa'ida Archive]; see also Nato
Official Claims Osama bin Laden is Living Comfortably in North-West Pakistan, CLEVELAND LEADER, Oct.
19, 2010, http://www.clevelandleader.com/node/15049.
28. Munir Ahmed, Pakistan probes reports of Qaida militant's death, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/09/29/pakistan-probes-reports-of-qaida
militants death/.
29. Spencer Ackerman, High-Tech Army Team Turns From Killers to Airborne Spies, WIRED, Aug. 16, 2010,
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/high-tech-army-task-force-turns-from-killers-to-
airborne-spies (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
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an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the
physical custody of the perpetrator."30
Drones are employed extensively as a weapon for targeted killing by the U.S. military,
and "[m]ore than forty countries now have such technology." Those opposing the use of
drones (particularly unmanned ones) do so on humanitarian grounds, fearing that such
drones "make[] violence too easy to undertake."32 However, the opposite may be more
likely: Unmanned drones provide a precise method for discriminating between the civilian
population and the lawful target, thus decreasing the overall casualties of an attack.3 3 Le-
gally speaking, the difference between employing an unmanned drone in an act of targeted
killing instead of a more traditional weapon (such as a gun or helicopter) is negligible. 34
II. Legality of Targeted Killing Generally Under Domestic and
International Law
A. Under Domestic Law
The United States has a complex and somewhat sordid history of targeted killing. After
the Roosevelt Corollary redefined the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. found itself acting politi-
cally and militarily in conflicts to which it was not officially a party.3 5 For example, the U.S.
intervened in Nicaragua in the 1980's.36 Covert U.S. operations were instrumental in the
toppling of the Allende administration in Chile in 1973.37 Assassination attempts occurred
on Castro in Cuba,38 and were successful against Pablo Escobar in Colombia.39
A change of heart, or at least of official policy, came about when the Ford administration
renounced assassination in an Executive Order (EO). 40 The Reagan administration's reite-
ration of this renunciation, spelled out in EO 12333, has continued in force. 41 EO 12333
prohibits the use of assassination by anyone employed by or working on behalf of the U.S.
government. "Assassination" is defined to include three elements: (1) the murder of a pri-
vate person (2) carried out covertly (3) for political ends. 42
However, targeted killing in a time of armed conflict is not an assassination, and is
therefore permissible domestic policy. 43 The Parks Memo of 1989 made this assertion
30. Alston, supra note 2, 1.
31. Id. ' 27.
32. KENNETH ANDERSON, TARGETED KILLING IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND LAW 8 (2009).
33. ld.
34. Alston, supra note 2, 79.
35. BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 43.
36. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.) 1986 I.C.I. 14 (June
27).
37. STAFF OF S. CoMM. To STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH
CONG., REPORT ON COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 63-372 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1963-73).
38. See, e.g., Duncan Campbell, 638 Ways to Kill Castro, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2006, at G2 (14).
39. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO 1 (2001).
40. Memorandum from Col. W. Hays Parks (Ret.), Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, to the Judge
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clear: "The term assassination when applied to wartime military activities against enemy
combatants or military objectives does not preclude acts of violence involving the element
of surprise."44 Instead, surprise attacks are only prohibited if they are "treacherous"-and
then only under international law, not a domestic framework. 45 The Memo also relies on
international law to establish that civilians lose their protected status and become legal
targets of war when they engage in the hostilities. 46 In sum, then, the Memo eviscerates EO
12333 of its prohibition when applied to times of armed conflict, making targeting killing
via drones (or any other legal weapon) an acceptable legal option for U.S. military forces. 47
The Parks Memo provides clarity on the issue of the domestic legality of targeted killing
in time of war.48 When coupled with the 2001 AUMF, which provides the legal basis for
stating that the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, this assertion translates
into domestic legal permission to employ targeted killing in the armed conflict in Afghanis-
tan. The question now turns on the legality of targeted killing via drones under interna-
tional law.
B. Under International Law
Under international humanitarian law (lHL), targeted killing is legal during a non-
international armed conflict where the target is a combatant, a fighter, or a civilian directly
participating in hostilities.49 Essentially, this definition involves two main determinations:
(1) the nature of the conflict, and (2) the nature of the targets of the killings. As analyzed
below, the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan functions as a non-international armed
conflict, and consequently the targeted killing, by any party, of combatants, fighters, or civi-
lians directly participating in hostilities is legal under the IHL paradigm.so
1. Nature of the Conflict
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines non-international armed
conflicts as "armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is pro-
tracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
44. Id.
45. Id. (applying Article 23(b) of the Annex to 1907 Hague Convention IV).
46. Parks, supra note 40. See infra Part II.B for a further discussion of the legal status of civilians who take
part in hostilities during armed conflict.
47. It is also interesting to note that the English word assassination derives from the hashshashin, a term
given to the violent attackers of the Shia sect, the Ismaili fedayeen, in the 11th century, whose tactics
mirror closely those of terrorists today. BOBBIrr, supra note 3, at 24-25.
48. Parks, supra note 40.
49. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. See also Protocol Additional Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol 11].
50. Note that three other elements apply to the analysis of targeted killing during international armed
conflicts: (1) the killing is a military necessity; (2) the degree of force used to execute the killing is
proportionate considering the potential danger to civilians and property in the area of the killing; and
(3) all feasible measures have been taken to ensure minimal harm to civilians and decrease the
chance of mistake. Alston, supra note 2, J 30 (relying on Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 1).
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between such groups."5 1
The conflict continues between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,
supported by NATO-led ISAF, and what is called "the insurgency." 52 This "insurgency" ap-
pears to be comprised primarily of the remains of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and al-Qa'ida's af-
filiates. 53 ISAF and associated troops are considered State parties, but determining the na-
ture of a non-State armed group proves much trickier to delineate. 54 The Taliban and al-
Qa'ida qualify as organized armed groups under the paradigm developed by Philip Alston
in his Addendum to the Report, which reflects principles of treaty law.55
Alston mentions three criteria for determining whether a non-State group qualifies as
an organized armed group: (1) minimal level of organization; (2) adequate command
structure; and (3) collective, armed, anti-government action.5 6 He relies heavily on Com-
mon Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II in developing this list.5 7
As noted supra in Part L.B., both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida maintain a minimal level of
organization. Both have identifiable leadership: Muhammed Omar and Osama bin Laden's
closest officials, respectively, along with their underling commanders.5 8 The Taliban's
command structure seems to hinge on its leader and the Council of United Mujahedeen,
while al-Qa'ida is run by the structure of vertical leadership established by bin Laden.5 9
Both groups continue to use armed violence to resist the NATO forces in Afghanistan. 60 At
least the Taliban also fights against the Afghani government, as evidenced in the violence it
demonstrated around the September 2010 parliamentary elections. 61
Since both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida meet a minimal level of organization, rely on a form
of command structure, and are engaged in armed conflict against a State party, they qualify
as non-State armed groups. They continue to engage in armed conflict on Afghan territory
against the Afghan government and its allies. Given this status, the current situation in Afg-
hanistan satisfies the Rome Statute definition of non-international armed conflict.
2. Nature of the Targets
The situation in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict. What, then, is the sta-
tus of the targets of the killings executed via drones? This question boils down to whether
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
52. Mission of the International Security Assistance Force, supra note 13.
53. Important to note is that the insurgency of Afghanistan does not qualify as a levie in masse, as this
characteristic would trigger a different set of rules under international humanitarian law. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field art 13(6), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.




58. See Taliban Archive, supra note 18.
59. Id. See also GUNARATNA, supra note 24, at 54.
60. See Filkins, supra note 23. See also Warrick & Finn, supra note 21.
61. Jon Boone, Afghanistan election violence fears lead UN to evacuate third of staff THE GUARDIAN, Sept
15, 2010, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/15/afghanistan-election-
violence-un-evacuation ("the Taliban have announced they will attack anyone involved in this
election").
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the Taliban and al-Qa'ida terrorists qualify as armed forces or civilians directly participat-
ing in the hostilities (DPH). Under the following analysis, it is likely that the leaders of both
organizations qualify as members of armed groups (CCF), while its operators definitely sa-
tisfy the criteria as DPH and may even qualify as members of armed forces (CCF) in certain
instances.
"The protection of civilians is one of the main goals of international humanitarian law." 62
Civilians are never to be targeted for attack.63 Proportionality and distinction are the "me-
ta-issues" of international humanitarian law. 64 Proportionality is the idea that the force
used must not exceed the degree of force necessary to fulfill the military objective, keeping
in mind the risk of collateral damage.65 Distinction requires military operations to distin-
guish between combatants, who may be lawfully targeted for attack, and civilians, who
may not.66
However, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol spend little time dis-
cussing non-international armed conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan, and do not men-
tion these two characteristics where they do.6 7 Proportionality is assumed in armed con-
flicts generally.68 Distinction is as assumed as well, but as Daphn& Richemond-Barak has
pointed out,
there are no combatants stricto sensu in non-international armed conflicts as combatants are defined
in the context of the Third Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I .... If there are no comba-
tants in non-international armed conflicts, how can there be a duty to distinguish between civilians
and combatants? 69
The ICRC's Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
sought to clear up this issue. It notes that despite the rhetorical lack of clear delineation be-
tween civilians and combatants, "both State and non-State parties to the conflict have
armed forces distinct from the civilian population."70 As Richemond-Barak concludes in an-
swer to her own question, "[i]n such conflicts [i.e., non-international armed conflicts], the
obligation to distinguish between protected and unprotected individuals holds, and for
62. NILS MELZER, ICRC, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 4
(2009) [hereinafter ICRC Guidelines].
63. Common Article 3, supra note 49; Additional Protocol II, supra note 49, art. 13. The article states
"civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations." Id.
64. Daphn6 Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of Distinction and Reciprocity, in
NEW BATTLEFIELDS/OLD LAWS: FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 109 (William
Banks ed., 2010).
65. Alston, supra note 2, 30.
66. See Richemond-Barak, supra note 64, at 110.
67. The only applicable treaty law to non-international armed conflicts are Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocol II (which includes no more than 28 articles, as
compared to the 102 articles (excluding the Annexes) of Additional Protocol I, dealing with
international armed conflicts).
68. States may only use the force necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives. See Alston, supra
note 2, T 75. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion].
69. Richemond-Barak, supra note 64, at 122. As Alston points out, from a policy perspective, it makes
sense for a State to use the least amount of force necessary to achieve its objective, than to use as
much force as it can get away with. See Alston, supra note 2, f 76-77.
70. ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 28 (looking to the wording of Common Article 3 to draw out this
understanding).
384
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such limited purposes, unprotected individuals are actually comparable to combatants in
international armed conflicts." 71
Despite the lack of direct language in treaty law, then, three categories of persons exist
in situations of non-international armed conflict: State armed forces, organized non-State
armed groups, and civilians. 72 Civilians are always protected under IHL, although they lose
their protection and become legal targets of attack via direct participation in hostilities.73
ISAF and Afghani troops, as members of the armed forces of the State parties to the con-
flict in Afghanistan, qualify as legal targets of attack. Taliban and al-Qa'ida terrorists, how-
ever, do not fit nicely into a category without a fact-based analysis. In order for the tar-
geted killings via drones to be legal under IHL, these terrorists must be demonstrated to be
either members of organized non-State armed groups (CCF), or civilians directly partici-
pating in hostilities (DPH). 74 The benefit of determining that an enemy is CCF is that the in-
dividual can then be legally targeted for attack at any time, while those who satisfy DPH
alone can only be attacked during the duration of their participation. 75
i. Continuous Combat Function (CCF)
Those individuals who qualify as part of the organized non-State armed group lose their
protection as civilians, but do not gain the legal benefits of combatant status.7 6 In its Guide-
lines, the ICRC bases the status of organized non-State armed groups on membership on
what it calls "continuous combat function." The leadership of both the Taliban and al-
Qa'ida qualify as legal targets of attack given their status as members of organized non-
State armed groups.
The ICRC Guidelines deny civilian protection to those individuals who have assumed
continuous combat function (CCF). 77 "Continuous combat function requires lasting integra-
tion into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State party to an
armed conflict."78 Three requirements are derived from this definition:
(1) lasting integration
(2) into the part of the armed group that actually uses arms against the State party
(3) in the violence of an armed conflict.
Identifiable leadership in the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, such as Muhammed Omar, satisfy all
three categories. They have been part of their respective organizations for extended
amounts of time. While it is unclear if commanding leadership carries and uses arms, they
71. Richemond-Barak, supra note 64, at 122.
72. See ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 27.
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id. at 33. Richemond-Barak disagrees and encourages an activity-based approach. Richemond-Barak,
supra note 64, at 113. However, as her analysis concerns itself primarily with international armed
conflicts, it is not addressed in this paper.
75. ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 70.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id.
78. Id at 34.
385
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certainly command those who do, similar to the role of a general in the U.S. Army. The vi-
olence which they command is an integral part of the armed conflict in Afghanistan. Given
these characteristics, the leadership of both groups qualifies as members of armed groups
under the ICRC guidelines. Additionally, should intelligence on the ground reveal that less-
er-level terrorists are engaged to the level specified by the ICRC, these terrorists may be
qualified as CCF.
ii. Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) 79
Civilians engaged directly in the hostilities of an armed conflict lose their protected sta-
tus and become legal targets of attack for the duration of their participation.80 Terrorists
who carry out the orders of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida leadership satisfy the criteria for DPH
and become legal targets of attack.
Even if they do not qualify as CCF, individuals carrying out attacks in the name of al-
Qa'ida or the Taliban qualify as legitimate targets under this paradigm. There are three
elements in determining whether or not a target qualifies as a legitimate target under the
direct participation in hostilities framework. The elements include:
(a) a threshold of harm,
(b) direct causation between the harm and the intended act, and
(c) a belligerent nexus linking the act to the parties of the conflict.81
a. Threshold of Harm
The threshold of harm element requires that the act be directed at the destruction of ei-
ther the military property of one of the parties of the armed conflict, or at the infliction of
harm on the persons or property of civilians or those otherwise protected from direct at-
tack.82 Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives attacking either NATO or Afghani security forces,
or targeting civilians, meet this first element.
b. Direct Causal Link
The second element looks for a direct link between the harm caused by the act, and the
act itself. 3 That is, the harm must be intended to be the direct effect of the act. Economic
sanctions or the development of a network that could impose harm on a party to the armed
79. While this paper treats the ICRC Guidelines as hard and fast rules for determining DPH, in reality this
is not true. The Guidelines are no more than guidelines, and States are not bound by any customary
international law in determining what, exactly, constitutes DPH. See Alston, supra note 2, 58. At the
same time, however, Alston's own definition of DPH comes very close to the Guidelines' definition,
and he relies substantially on the Guidelines in his own report. Id. T 60-69.
80. ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 44-45; see also Customary International Humanitarian Law Rule 6,
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul-rule6 (last visited
Apr. 9, 2011).
81. ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 46.
82. Id. at 47.
83. Id. at 51.
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conflict do not qualify as "direct" acts. 84 Acts of Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives such as
armed attacks on NATO troops or civilians qualify as direct attacks, while the mere exis-
tence of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida networks does not.
c. Belligerent Nexus
Last, the act must be carried out with a belligerent nexus.85 This requirement means that
the act must be intended to benefit one party to the armed conflict, to the detriment of
another party.86 The act cannot be a demonstration of mere thoughtless violence. The
planned attacks of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida meet this requirement, as they usually entail
an element of intention. For example, the Taliban intended to discourage support for NATO
and the current Afghani government by threatening violence around the recent elections.8 7
Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives who take part in acts against NATO and Afghani securi-
ty forces qualify as legitimate targets under DPH, even if they do not qualify as CCF. Conse-
quently, they are legitimate targets of direct attack during the time in which they are pre-
paring for or participating in the qualifying act.88
III. Policy: The Need for Systematic Target Selection Procedures
Regarding the Use of Targeted Drone Attacks
The heart of the debate over the legality of targeted drone attacks concerns policy con-
siderations. Under both domestic and international law, the use of targeted killing of legal
targets is permissible. However, is it good policy?89 And, more urgently, do the targeted kil-
lings carried out by the U.S. actually qualify as legal killings?
The answer to both questions is a disappointingly vague "maybe." The definition of good
policy is inherently a fact-driven and opinion-based determination. As to the second ques-
tion, like the notorious three monkeys, the U.S. government seems to have engaged in a
"see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" policy strategy regarding the use of drones. This is
particularly true of its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which, until recently, did not offi-
cially recognize its drone program, yet employs it extensively to eliminate terrorist targets
in northern Pakistan.90
It is no secret that the U.S. relies on drones in its war strategy against the insurgency in
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id.
87. Boone, supra note 61.
88. ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 65.
89. The question of whether targeted killing is ethical will not be addressed in this paper, as it falls
beyond the scope of the research. However, for a fascinating discussion regarding the ethical
underpinnings of killing, see Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan:
The False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 899 (2010).
90. Siobhan Gorman, Drones Target Terror Plot, WALL ST. I., Sept. 27, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703694204575518553113206756.html. Note
that since the CIA is not technically a branch of the armed forces, the CIA's use of targeted killing
involves further legal analysis which will not be addressed in this paper. However, its position on the
use of targeted killing affects the policy and public debate elements of targeted killing generally.
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Afghanistan.9 1 Yet the administration repeatedly refuses to produce publicly any guidelines
that would set forth the procedures and safeguards used by U.S. forces in determining the
legality of a target.92 Given the importance of transparency in international rule of law, and
its role as a check on executive power, as well as the political legitimacy to be gained by
identifying the procedures used in targeting, President Obama's administration has much
to gain by being more forthcoming with the procedures engaged to ensure compliance.
A. Is the Use of Targeted Killing Good Policy?
The first issue to be addressed is whether the use of targeted killing via drones is good
policy generally. At its best, targeted killing can be justified as good policy insofar as it is a
quick, militarily efficient means of eliminating a target with minimal civilian casualties.9 3 At
its worst, targeted killing is a gross violation of right to life by depriving an individual of his
or her life without due process of the law, and it aggravates the hostilities instead of alle-
viating them.94
1. The Benefits of Targeted Killing as a Military Strategy
On the positive side, targeted killing-particularly via drones-is an effective military
strategy with minimal risk to troops. "The appeal of armed drones is clear: [E] specially in
hostile terrain, they permit targeted killings at little to no risk to the State personnel carry-
ing them out, and they can be operated remotely from the home State."95 In fact, the CIA
reportedly operates its drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan from its headquarters in Lang-
ley, Virginia.96 Drone strikes serve the critical function of disrupting terrorist planning.97
They are also "more protective of civilian lives than high aerial bombing or long-range ar-
tillery"9 -an incredibly important aspect of the technology, given that IHL strives to mi-
nimize casualties to civilians to a level of absolute zero.
91. Evan Perez, White House Defends Targeted Killing Program, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703793804575512283152390778.html.
92. The most specific set of guidelines identified to date can be found in the COIN manual, used by
commanders in Afghanistan. Noah Shachtman, Does Petraeus Mean a Return of Afghanistan Air War?,
WIRED, June 23, 2010, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/06/does-petraeus-mean-a-return-
to-all-out-war.
93. Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting: Hearing before the H. Subcomm.
on National Sec. and Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Mary Ellen O'Connell, Robert
and Marion Short Chair in Law, University of Notre Dame) (examining the legality of unmanned
targeting) [hereinafter O'Connell].
94. Id.
95. Alston, supra note 2, 27.
96. Id. 20.
97. Gorman, supra note 90 ("U.S. officials believe that conducting attacks in an area where militants are
present can disrupt planned attacks, even if they do not hit the precise cell plotting the attack.").
According to this article, and in the words of the anonymous U.S. official interviewed, missile strikes
in Pakistan are " 'a product of precise intelligence and precise weapons. We've been hitting targets
that pose a threat to our troops in Afghanistan and terrorists plotting attacks in South Asia and




98. O'Connell, supra note 93.
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2. The Downsides of Targeted Killing as Military Strategy
However, relying on targeted killing as policy has its costs. Most crucial to the discussion
of counter-terrorism is the tendency of targeted killing to alienate the civilian population."9
Similarly, while in command of the allied forces in Afghanistan, General McChrystal limited
the use of airstrikes because "[t]he bombs were causing too many civilian casualties." 00 As
a reminder to those who advocate the use of drones as a troop-casualty-free tactic, under
the ICRC Guidelines' definition of DPH, the drone operators based in Langley are legal tar-
gets of attack as DPH. 01 There also exists the possibility that long-distance guidance of
drones and missiles may decrease the reliability of intelligence on the ground.102
The benefits of employing targeted killing via drones are not clear-cut, but they are con-
vincing. While the downsides of drone use urges restraint, it is probably better to use
drones than to use heavy artillery or other more intensive military attack strategies. Re-
gardless of the conclusions of analysts in this regard, it is evident that the U.S. executive has
relied on drones in the war in Afghanistan, and is likely to continue to rely on drones in its
further war on terror generally. 0 3
B. Is the U.S. Complying with IHL Standards, and Should the U.S. Comply?
Assuming that targeted killing is good policy, should the U.S. publicly comply with IHL
standards in its use of targeted killing? Strong policy considerations urge the Obama ad-
ministration to seriously consider publicizing the procedures employed by the U.S. in de-
termining its targets and the safeguards in place to minimize the abuse of this tactic. 104
At least from an ideological perspective, the objectives of IHL and counter-terrorism are
nearly indistinguishable. Counter-terrorism seeks to suppress gross violations of the prin-
ciple of distinction: The intentional targeting and killing of civilians. From this perspective,
then, adherence to IHL is a natural tool of counter-terrorism. In practice, IHL is treated as a
hampering force on counter-terrorism, as evidenced by the Bush administration's tactics to
avoid the application of the Geneva Conventions. 10s While any practical pitfalls of adhering
to IHL should be addressed frankly by the Obama administration, President Obama could
still benefit from recognizing the closely related aims of IHL and counter-terrorism in his
rhetoric.
99. PHILIP HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 64 (2005).
100. Shachtman, supra note 93.
101. Alston, supra note 2, 71.
102. Id. T 82. But see Ackerman, supra note 29 (detailing the new role of unmanned drones as intelligence
gatherers working closely with ground troops). This possibility highlights the necessity of
establishing systematic target selection procedures in order to reinforce the reliability of intelligence
used in selection targets.
103. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 2.
104. One need not look far back in history to see that power, when left unchecked by strong legal rules,
will be abused. See, e.g., William H. Taft, IV, A View From the Top: American Perspectives on
International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 503 (2006) (discussing the violations of
customary international law committed by U.S. troops when the Bush administration relaxed its rules
regarding detainee treatment).
105. Id. at 506-09.
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1. Procedural Guidelines Necessary to Show the U.S. is Complying, Beyond Mere
Affirmations by Politicians
In order to ensure that the United States is complying with its own stated adherence to
IHL standards in war, the Obama administration should make public the procedures used
in selecting targets of targeted killing. Strong arguments have been made to this effect. As
stated scathingly by Philip Alston, "[t]he refusal by States who conduct targeted killings to
provide transparency about their policies violates the international legal framework that
limits the unlawful use of lethal force against individuals."1 0 6 His criticism does not stop
there: "A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill."107 To
clarify the U.S. position, Alston recommends disclosing the procedures and safeguards in
place to ensure that before each targeted killing is carried out, intelligence is reliable and
the intended force is proportionate. 108 He stresses the importance of developing "the crite-
ria for individuals who may be targeted and killed, the existence of any substantive or pro-
cedural safeguards to ensure the legality and accuracy of killings, and the existence of ac-
countability methods" in the U.S. war strategy.109
Alston's recommendations find support elsewhere. Philip Heymann and Juliette Kayyem
voice similar opinions, based on years of careful research and consultation with counter-
terrorism and national security experts in both the U.S. and the United Kingdom. 110 They
recommend that targeted killing decisions be based on reliable evidence of the necessity of
the elimination of the target (including evidence of an absolute lack of alternative methods
of elimination), according to procedures developed by the President, submitted to the ap-
propriate subcommittees in Congress, and eventually approved by the Houses."1 These
procedures "should also be made public. The public would be better served by an open and
enunciated policy than by the secret and ambiguous policy that the United States seems to
now embrace."1 2
2. Public Procedures Safeguard Against Unwarranted Expansion of Executive
Power
In part, the public would be better served by such public procedures because their pub-
lication would serve as a check on executive power.113 Alston echoes this concern, noting
that executive power is strengthened in situations of armed conflicts. 114 Public discussion
on the issue of the legal status of terrorists often conflates means and method analysis with
status analysis.115 This means that many well-meaning citizens are suspicious of targeting
106. Alston, supra note 2, 87.
107. Id. 88.
108. Id. 89.
109. Id. 1 22.
110. HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 99, at vii.
111. Id. at 67.
112. Id. at 67-68.
113. This assertion is supported by the concern behind Heymann and Kayyem's study, that is, the
expansion of executive power in recent years. Id. at 3.
114. Alston, supra note 2, 47.
115. See, e.g., "Intelligence Squared" Debate (Bloomberg TV television broadcast Sept. 25, 2010). See also
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individuals, even in times of war, based on a fear that such allowances expand the execu-
tive's power beyond what is constitutionally valid. 116 If Obama wants to win over public
sentiment in support of targeted killing, he should delineate how this policy does not vi-
olate the rights of terrorists-how targeted killing is legal, not just another expansion of
executive power similar to Bush's expanded use of torture. Instead of simply trying to ig-
nore the issue, it makes more sense politically for a state to take measures to ensure that it
is not breaking laws to which it is bound. 117 No political expediency is served by refusing to
publicly identify the steps the military takes to comply with the laws by which it claims to
be bound.
3. The Strategic Role of Public Procedures to the Rule of Law in International
Relations
The strategic position of the rule of law in international relations brings urgency to this
recommendation to publicize the procedures used in target selection. Recent scholarship
highlights the intricate relationship between the rule of law in international relations and
counter-terrorism. 118 The general idea is that terrorism is best countered by rule of law
both within and between countries because the global nature of terrorism requires inter-
national cooperation.119 As noted by former legal advisor to the State Department William
H. Taft, IV, "the world is a dangerous place, perhaps most dangerous for the strongest and
most prosperous states because they have the most to lose. For the same reasons we pro-
mote the rule of law within states, we need also to promote it among them."120
For the purposes of the analysis here, rule of law in international relations means the
adherence to a set of rules above domestic law by cooperating with other sovereigns.121
IHL is one of these sets of rules, and adhering to IHL benefits sovereigns themselves be-
cause IHL is inherently apolitical, its aim being to preserve the humane treatment of indi-
viduals even in times of armed conflict.122
Rule of law is critical to counter-terrorism, and it applies to all nations involved in coun-
ter-terrorism-including the United States. In fact, al-Qaeda reportedly lost support in the
Muslim world because of its lawless tactics. 123 The U.S. and its allies could capitalize on this
Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism oflus ad Bellum and ]us in Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47 (2009).
116. Id.
117. Also, a lack of systematic procedural standards may expose drone operators to guilt under
international and domestic law for following the orders of their commanders. See Alston, supra note
2, 71.
118. Rudolf Dolzer, Clouds on the Horizon of Humanitarian Law?, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 337 (2003); Taft, supra
note 104, at 503; Derek links, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE 1. INT'L L. 1 (2003).
119. See, e.g., id. at 47 ("As the United States seeks to build a durable and effective transnational coalition
against terrorism, humanitarian law (including the laws of war) provides a stable, widely-endorsed
normative framework for condemning the attacks."). The global nature of counterterrorism does not
suggest that an internationally acceptable definition of "terrorism" has been reached, but rather that
nations agree that terrorism is a very real global threat.
120. Taft, supra note 104, at 510.
121. See Dolzer, supra note 118, at 339 (discussing the importance of "cooperation based on legal rules").
122. See links, supra note 118, at 47; see also Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 68, 78 (discussing the
principle of distinction between civilians and combatants as a "cardinal principle").
123. Dina Temple-Raston, As Support Fades, Al-Qaida Shows Signs of Decline, NPR, Apr. 26, 2010,
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loss of support "by distinguishing [them]selves through commitment to the rule of law, es-
pecially by strict compliance with the rules governing lethal force."124 If the United States
wants rule of law elsewhere, it should put rule of law to practice at home. If there is a com-
pelling reason not to comply with IHL, then the U.S. should articulate this reason, without
compromising military intelligence, in order to show that any non-adherence to IHL is an
aberration from the rule of law norm. The Obama administration can reinforce this rule of
law by making public its procedures for selecting targets of targeted killing.
4. Procedures, Not Fact-eppesen Distinctions
Asking the administration to go public with more details on the procedures used to en-
sure compliance in targeted killings does not necessarily jeopardize national security. Un-
like the petitioner's complaints in Muhamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, the act of going public
with procedures does not require the public revelation of state secrets.125 In Jeppesen, the
plaintiffs sought to bring claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act against Jeppesen Dataplan,
a U.S. corporation, for liability in assisting the CIA in its extraordinary rendition pro-
gram. 126 The nature of the claims would have required that facts of the extraordinary ren-
dition program be produced as evidence to the court, and publicly discussed at trial.127 The
United States moved to intervene, claiming the state secrets doctrine; its motion was
granted by the district court and the case was dismissed.128 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal because "there is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability
without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets."129 The court emphasized
that, while the state secret doctrine should only be invoked in rare situations, it was ap-
propriate here."s0 Although much evidence would be available publicly, evidence privileged
under the state secret doctrine was intimately linked to unprivileged evidence and there-
fore the discussion of the unprivileged (i.e., public) information would compromise the
privileged information.131
Unlike Muhamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, when it comes to targeted killing as policy, factual
details of targets and attacks are not necessary. However, procedural standards are critical,
for the reasons discussed above: clarifying adherence to appropriate international law, li-
miting executive power, maintaining the moral and political high ground, and increasing
the rule of law. The distinction between the disclosure of facts and the disclosure of proce-
dures is essential. By requiring only the disclosure of procedures, the issues which led to
the dismissal of jeppesen are avoided. State secrets are not compromised to the extent that
the procedures should comply with what is publicly known already-the requirements of
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=126228610.
124. O'Connell, supra note 93.
125. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 3575 (U.S. May 16, 2011) (No. 10-778).
126. Id. at 1075.
127. Id. at 1088-89.
128. Id. at 1093.
129. Id. at 1087.
130. Id. at 1081.
131. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010), cert denied, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 3575 (U.S. May 16, 2011) (No. 10-778).
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IHL for determining legitimate targets. Of course, if the administration determines that the
public dissemination of the procedures would, in fact, compromise an important state se-
cret, then the administration should say so publicly and honestly, as the government as-
serted in Jeppesen Dataplan.132 However, since the administration publicly proclaims its
adherence to IHL,133 this situation does not seem likely.
5. Due Process Considerations
Some advocates in the field of human rights assert that targeted killing denies individu-
als due process. 134 However, due process does not require that each target be given the op-
portunity to defend him or herself before a legitimate judicial authority before being elimi-
nated: "[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not
required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force."135
Still, in non-international armed conflicts such as the situation in Afghanistan, a target is
not lawful until it has qualified as such under either CCF or DPH.136 Without public disclo-
sure of the procedures for enforcing compliance with applicable law, it is impossible to de-
termine whether or not the government is adhering to the requirements of law. Making
public the procedures for target selection may be the most effective means to confront the
human right challenges to targeted killing. In particular, if the U.S. wants to keep the higher
moral ground, it should afford the public the process of clear, systematic target selection
procedures to minimize the risk of targeting an unlawful target (i.e., a civilian), and thereby
invoking guilt for a war crime under the Rome Statute.13 7
6. Insufficiencies of Current Public Knowledge
Currently, publicly available disclosures on the procedures surrounding targeted killing
are disappointingly vague, despite the administration's insistence that the U.S. is in com-
pliance with its obligations under international law. According to Koh, current legal advi-
sor to the State Department, the United States' "general approach" to determining mem-
bership in al-Qa'ida and Taliban "is consistent with the approach taken in the targeting
context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH)."1 38 He
also asserts that the U.S. is entitled to "use force consistent with its inherent right to self-
defense under international law."1 39
132. Id. at 1083.
133. See Koh, supra note 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See ICRC Guidelines, supra note 62, at 12.
137. The Rome Statute criminalizes the intentional attack of civilians who are not categorized as DPH.
Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
138. Koh, supra note 1.
139. Id.
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i. The COIN Manual
U.S. forces in Afghanistan rely in part on the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) manual for reg-
ulations on how to confront the conflict on the ground. 140 The COIN manual, employed by
the U.S. Army, addresses the issue of targeted killing via "airstrike," a term that seems to
include both manned and unmanned airpower.141 Depending on its interpretation, the ma-
nual actually discourages the use of airstrikes, emphasizing the risk of collateral damage.
General McChrystal interpreted this narrowly permitting airstrikes only after the ground
commanders fulfilled three criteria: (1) demonstrated via multiple intelligences that civi-
lians were not present at the target site; (2) proof that no other alternatives remained to
eliminate the target; and (3) a strategy to justify the strike to the locals.142 General Pe-
traeus, who recently replaced McChrystal as commander in Afghanistan, is more lenient in
his use of airstrikes. 143
Regarding targeting generally, the manual details four procedural steps to carrying out a
targeted attack: deciding what to target; detecting the target; delivering (conducting the
target attack); and assessing the effects of the attack.144 Any consideration of the legality of
the target appears to take place in the first step, decision, although the manual does not
specifically address legality. 145
ii. The Joint Doctrine on Targeting
The Joint Doctrine on Targeting sets the standards and guidelines of targeted attacks
taken by joint effort of the respective branches of the armed forces. 146 It emphasizes an ef-
fect-oriented approach.147 Legal considerations are mentioned as part of the second phase
of the joint target cycle, as part of target development and prioritization. 148 The legality of
the target under both the law of war and the U.S. rules of engagement is examined at this
state, on par with the viability of the target and a cost-benefit analysis of the target.149
iii. The Insufficiencies of the COIN Manual and theJoint Doctrine
Both the COIN manual and the Joint Doctrine indicate the U.S. military's predisposition
to defer to the laws of war in conducting targeted attacks. This position coincides with the
rhetoric of the Obama administration. 150 Such deference is laudable. However, it is far too
140. As a civilian organization, the CIA approach embraces the President's mandate to "disrupt, dismantle
and defeat al-Qaeda," relying heavily on the use of targeted drone attacks. Warrick & Finn, supra note
21.
141. U.S. ARMY, U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL No. 3-24 (2006), at E-1 [hereinafter COIN MANUAL].
142. Shachtman, supra note 92; see also Memorandum from ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan (July 6,
2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official-texts/Tactical-Directive-090706.pdf
143. Shachtman, supra note 92.
144. COIN MANUAL, supra note 141, at 5-29.
145. Id. 5-106.
146. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING, JOINT PUBLICATION No. 3-60 (2002)
[hereinafter JOINT DOCTRINE].
147. Id. at 1-10.
148. Id. at 11-4.
149. Id.
150. Koh, supra note 1.
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easy for a government to claim to adhere to certain international laws, and much more dif-
ficult for a government to actually prove itself in this regard. The Obama administration
obviously has benign intentions when it comes to the implementation of international hu-
manitarian law. A public elucidation of the procedures used by government actors in decid-
ing whether a target satisfies the requisite standards of international humanitarian law
would bolster the administration's legitimacy by matching words with actions.
The current COIN manual and joint Doctrine are guidelines which encourage adherence
to IHL, but they fail to spell out how commanders should apply IHL. In fact, they both lack
any explanation of what IHL even requires when it comes to determining whether a target
is legitimate. But such explanations of the standards are necessary. Otherwise, the public
does not have a measure by which to judge whether the standards the executive claims to
abide by are being met.
7. Self-Defense is Not the Appropriate Paradigm for Targeted Killing
Critics of the continued reliance on IHL as the appropriate international law paradigm in
the war against terrorism insist that IHL has "the deleterious effect of deforming the laws
of war . 1.5. st In particular, requiring that targets first meet IHL standards for legitimate
targets before lethal force is applied cripples a state's ability to effectively counter real and
urgent threats to national security. 152 When it comes to targeted killing, instead of relying
on outdated IHL standards, the United States is encouraged to rely on its domestic law and
the right to self-defense, as recognized by the Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.1s3 In this way,
"as long as a targeted killing legitimately meets the legal criteria of self-defense, it can be
lawful to target people who might not be, under the strict law of IHL armed conflict, com-
batants."154
i. Jus ad Bellum IJus in Bello Conflation
The fundamental flaw of this argument is its inherent conflation of jus ad bellum and jus
in bello.'ss It presupposes that a public adherence to IHL (the codification of jus in bello)
will compromise a state's flexibility to resort to lethal force under jus ad bellum. This pre-
sumption is mistaken. 156 Moreover, advocating the reliance on the right to self-defense as
the legal basis for targeted killing endangers international relations by removing a crucial
component of accountability, since eradicating the jus in bello component of the duality
erases a state's ability to criticize a use of force apart from the justifications for resorting to
force in the first place.157 Under the duality of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, criticism of a
151. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 33.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 18.
154. Id. at 33.
155. See Sloane, supra note 115, at 50, 76.
156. Id. at 50 ("In theory, then, any use of force may be simultaneously lawful and unlawful: unlawful,
because its author had no right to force under the jus ad bellum; lawful, if and to the extent that its
author observes 'the rules,' that is, the jus in bello.").
157. That is, without jus in bello, there is no IHL and no basis on which a state can criticize, for example,
torture of civilians if the civilians are tortured in a war considered legitimate-such as a war to end
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state's original resort to force was separated from criticisms of the force it exerted in the
resulting armed conflict. 58 Under the right to self-defense, a state's use of force in an
armed conflict would be justified by that state's alleged justification in resorting to force in
the first place.'59 In other words, forsaking the duality results in a return to the days of just
war theory and "might is right."
ii. Fear of Loss ofSovereignty
One of the fears prominent within this analysis insists that the codification of target se-
lection procedures, as currently formulated under IHL, would essentially codify interna-
tional law in U.S. domestic law.'6 0 This is a legitimate concern insofar as it addresses the
common fear that deference to international law undermines national sovereignty. How-
ever, as analyzed by recent scholarship, domestic law and international law have coexisted
for the past 200 years without any traceable depreciation in U.S. national sovereignty. 161
The United States is a sovereign equal to all other states under international law.162 It
would not kowtow to international pressures by publicly producing the procedures it re-
lies on in adhering to the IHL standards to which it currently claims to be bound. 163 In fact,
by insisting on compliance with IHL, the United States would reap the benefit of increasing
international rule of law, a critical component to the global counter-terrorism effort.164 Ab-
andoning the principles and rules developed within IHL would only prove detrimental to
counter-terrorism, as well as to international relations more generally.16 5
IV. Conclusion
Targeted drone attacks against individuals qualified under either CCF or DPH in situa-
tions of armed conflict are a legal war strategy under both international and U.S. domestic
law. The Obama administration knows and insists that appropriate targeted killing is legal
under domestic and international law.166 The military has good intentions of following in-
ternational humanitarian law when it comes to targeted killing.167 However, without
transparency regarding the procedures used in determining the legality of the targets, it is
impossible for the general public to know whether the military is actually implementing
IHL in its use of targeted drone attacks.168 Consequently, the administration is strongly
genocide. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 78.
160. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 28.
161. See INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (David L. Sloss, Michael D.
Ramsey & William S. Dodge, eds., 2011).
162. LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Thomas Reuters 5th ed. 2009).
163. See Koh, supra note 1.
164. See Taft, supra note 104, at 511.
165. See Dolzer, supra note 118, at 339.
166. Koh, supra note 1.
167. See, e.g., JOINT DOCTRINE, supra note 146.
168. Barring, of course, another set of "WikiLeaks" such as the one that roused certain attitudes regarding
Pakistan's role in the Afghani insurgency. See Spencer Ackerman, WikiLeaks Drops 90,000 War Docs;
Fingers Pakistan as Insurgent Ally, WIRED, July 25, 2010,
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urged to consider the immediate public disclosure of all appropriate target selection pro-
cedures to demonstrate U.S. compliance with the IHL standards to which it adheres.
pakistan-as-insurgent-ally/.
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